

Precious few Americans, even here in Vietnam, understand the luridly unreal character of the war plans Hanoi adopted in response to the U.S. intervention on the ground in 1965. The aims were to cut the country in half at the waist and to invest the city of Saigon; and these aims were to be achieved by a major troop buildup despite the U.S. intervention.

The landscape is littered with phantoms of these aims. For instance, the move against Saigon was to be led by the Fifth VC Division, coming down from Phuocuy Province, with the Ninth VC and the Seventh North Vietnamese divisions pushing over from the West in support.

Because of the harsh attrition inflicted by Gen. William C. Westmoreland's search-and-destroy strategy, the supposed leading division, the Fifth VC, never really reached divisional status. Its operations officer, Lt. Col. Nam Hung, defected last summer, revealing that his outfit still possessed only two regiments, one completely worthless and both riddled with malaria.

Avoidance of combat appeared for a long time to be this miserable outfit's prime purpose. More recently, the two regiments have been brought back to semi-life by the injection of North Vietnamese replacements. But their quality can still be judged from the fact that the main effort by one of them—a battalion-sized surprise attack—was successfully repelled by a single company of the rag-tag regional force-militia.

As for the Seventh North Vietnamese Division, over on the Laos border, it is even more a division in name only than the Fifth VC, and again because of the effects of general attrition. It has one combat-ready regiment, but its main function is now to serve as a replacement depot through which infiltrating North Vietnamese troops are staged to fill gaps in the ranks of other units.

The reason for all this can be swiftly discerned if one turns to the Ninth VC Division, once a ferociously tough fighting outfit wholly manned by Southerners. As early as last August, the Ninth had suffered so badly, and local recruitment had declined so gravely, that most of the battalions had to be filled up to half their strength with Northern soldiers.

In consequence, the "Cedar Falls" documents bristle with angry complaints of the North-South friction in the Ninth VC Division. More recently, an entire North Vietnamese regiment, the 101st, was inserted into this once-proud Southern Division to permit relief of the horribly mauled 271st VC Regiment. Thus the latter was withdrawn from combat—at any rate that was the hope—to help guard the enemy's deep-hidden Southern headquarters, COSVN, as it is called.

For a year and a half, in sum, everything has been sacrificed to keep the Ninth VC Division up to strength. But all three regiments of this division have just been hideously decimated once again in the "Junction City" operation. And just the other day, at Landing Zone George, even the COSVN guard-regiment, the unlucky 271st and the 70th, were at last cornered and worked over till they broke and ran after very heavy losses. COSVN itself has been driven to take refuge in Cambodia.

In III Corps, furthermore, barring assorted provincial battalions, COSVN no longer has a single big unit in fighting trim. One wonders what will be done about this. But one wonders even more about what will be done about the even more acute and painful problem of the formerly impenetrable war zones.

Here is where the vast machines of the American special commands have played a vital role. In Gen. Westmoreland's big operations in the "Iron Triangle" and War Zone C, the destruction of endless fortifications and the capture of many tons of documents have got the headlines.

But they have been immeasurably less important than the construction of airstrips, the insertion of heavily fortified special forces camps at strategic points, and the swift thrust of great military roads into the very heart of the enemy's once-immune base areas. Ma Tse-tung, it must be remembered, long ago laid down the rule that without "immune" base areas, any guerrilla movement was "doomed to defeat." Just because the base areas have so dramatically ceased to be immune, it does not mean that all the problems of the III Corps Area are going to be solved overnight.

In most of the III Corps provinces, the task of pacification still presents very grave problems. But the crucial fact remains that the enemy's problems in III Corps are now infinitely graver than our problems. One may guess they have, in fact, become wholly insoluble.

VISIT TO VIETNAM

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, I rise to address my remarks to the American people on the most serious problem confronting the Nation today—the Vietnam war and our Asian policies.

I returned only last week, Mr. President, from 2 weeks in southeast Asia. I made this trip while the Senate was in Easter recess because I wanted to observe first hand the conditions under which our troops are operating—and the outlook for the future.

Mr. President, I wish that others could have been with me as I talked with young American men in the field in Vietnam, and in the jungles of that far removed, wartorn Asian nation.

To see these young Americans and to talk with them is to gain confidence anew in the United States for they, just as did the men at Valley Forge, are giving the world new lessons in self-sacrifice, in valor, and in unquestioned devotion to duty.

Being in Vietnam focused my mind on two thoughts concerning which we hear little in the United States.

One is that despite the frequent warnings that we must not escalate the war against the enemy, the hard truth is that it is being escalated every day against the American people.

The other thought is my conviction that total American effort must be directed toward the objective of securing more military aid in Vietnam from the Asians themselves, and from our allies throughout the world.

Mr. President, it was my purpose in going to Vietnam to learn first hand if our servicemen are receiving the best leadership and the best supplies we can provide them and the full measure of support to which they are entitled.

I wanted to see what the American people, through their government, could do to help them in the task they have been assigned.

Theirs is a tremendous task.

The magnitude of the United States undertaking in Vietnam can be appreciated only if one is aware that we are in effect fighting two wars—the military war and at the same time a political war involving a social revolution.

The American Government has undertaken not only to free South Vietnam of communism, and to stop the infiltration of Communists from the north, but it also

is undertaking to bring democracy to every village and hamlet in the nation.

This it seeks to do in a nation in which less than one-half of the people are literate. It lays great stress on the so-called elections. Yet, formal education for most Vietnamese stops at the fourth grade. They have had no experience with democratic government.

My 2 weeks in southeast Asia tended to confirm or accentuate many of my earlier views on the war. It also stimulated my interest in the whole problem of southeast Asia.

I wanted to reflect on my trip and to think about what I saw before presenting publicly my observations regarding the U.S. position in Vietnam.

And I might say that during the 2 weeks I was outside of the United States, I adhered strictly to my policy of avoiding public comment on U.S. foreign policy while on foreign shores.

Privately, I sought the views of military and civilian leaders in Vietnam, in Thailand, in Taiwan.

For the most part, I received frank answers from those with whom I talked. Occasionally, there was evasion and sometimes propaganda, but on the whole there was only frankness.

Only a part of my time was spent with these leaders. I spent a great deal of time with the troops—with those who serve as riflemen and artillerymen and cooks and truck drivers and pilots and mechanics. I shook hands and talked with 700 to 800 Americans, including many Virginians from every part of the Commonwealth.

The American people can take both confidence and pride in the professional military leadership in Vietnam.

I refer not only to Gen. William C. Westmoreland, with whom I twice discussed our problems. He is a soldier of great ability.

While in Vietnam I visited the areas of each of his four major commanders, from Da Nang in the north to the Mekong Delta in the south.

I was highly impressed with the ability of Lt. Gen. Lewis W. Walt, commanding general of the 3d Marine Amphibious Force at Da Nang; with Lt. Gen. Stanley R. Larsen, commanding general of the 1st Field Force; with Lt. Gen. Jonathan O. Seaman, commanding general of the 2d Field Force, and with Adm. Norvel G. Ward who directs our operations in the Mekong Delta. The air operations are capably directed by Lt. Gen. William W. Momyer, commander 7th Air Force.

I found this same high quality of leadership with our forces at sea. The 7th Fleet is ably commanded by Vice Adm. John V. Hyland, and Carrier Task Force 77 is under the dynamic leadership of Rear Adm. David C. Richardson.

The degree of cooperation between the various services is outstanding. From the B-52 bases at Guam to the airfields of Vietnam I heard time and again high praise for the work being done by the infantrymen and the marines who are fighting the ground war.

Conversely, from the 1st Infantry Division, from the 25th Infantry Division, and from the 3d Marine Amphibious Forces, comments were frequently volun-

teered as to the vital part the Air Force, including naval aviation, is playing in the war.

While in a helicopter observing a combat assault landing near the Cambodian border, I asked Brig. Gen. Bernard W. Rogers, of the 1st Infantry Division, through the intercom system, his appraisal of the work of the Air Force. "Great, great," he replied.

One has to visit the almost impenetrable jungles to understand the natural sanctuaries the enemy in Vietnam enjoys and to appreciate the odds against our men in seeking out and destroying this enemy.

In this difficult mission, our huge Guam-based B-52 bombers have played a significant role. Here again the cooperation between the services is dramatized by a policy of Major General Krum, commanding general of the Strategic Air Command at Guam: He sends two flight crews each month to live with an infantry unit so that the aircrews may know firsthand the conditions on the ground.

Generally, the morale of our men is high. I found this to be the case almost everywhere I went, and it seemed particularly true at the forward areas.

For example, at one remote outpost north of Da Nang, I talked with 14 marines. They, along with two Vietnamese, comprise the combined action force guarding the adjacent Vietnamese village. Of the 14 American marines, two had voluntarily extended their enlistment for 6 months.

I would like to emphasize, too, that it was my observation that the morale of the Negro serviceman is equally as high, and the job he is doing is equally as good, as his white counterpart.

The dominant reason for the high morale appears to be the definite termination date to which each man can look forward. Under present policy, he knows that at the end of 1 year he will be returned to the United States.

Another important morale factor is the excellent medical attention our men receive. Evacuation helicopters quickly transport the wounded to base hospitals.

For example, on Easter Sunday I visited a field hospital north of Da Nang. My helicopter landed at the same time as did an evacuation helicopter with four wounded marines and two wounded Vietnamese. They had been hit only 30 minutes before, thus indicating the speed with which our wounded can receive medical attention.

In this connection, the pilots and corpsmen in these evacuation helicopters deserve great credit. They go in under fire to remove their wounded comrades and in doing so they suffer an even greater percentage of casualties than our combat men.

In Thailand, while I had been aware of the buildup, I am frank to say I had not realized its extent.

Thailand in itself is becoming a major military endeavor. More than half the Air Force strike missions against North Vietnam are flown from Thailand.

The United States has put a great deal of money into building four large military bases, and even more U.S. funds will be spent.

The Thais receive the Americans well.

Some of this no doubt is due to delicate negotiations for the bases which were ably handled by Ambassador Graham A. Martin.

Thailand's potential is considerably greater than that of Vietnam. It has 32 million people compared to Vietnam's 16 million; an area of 198,000 square miles compared with Vietnam's 65,000.

Thailand has a history of relative political stability in sharp contrast to Vietnam's recent history.

Now for the deeper implications of our position in Vietnam and southeast Asia:

A recognized authority on Asia, Edwin O. Reischauer, former American Ambassador in Japan, the country of his birth, had this to say a few days ago:

There is not much agreement in this country (U.S.) about the war in Viet Nam, except that it is something we should have avoided. We are paying a heavy price for it in lives, in national wealth and unity, and in international prestige and influence.

In a provocative article written for *Look* magazine, the scholar-diplomat says:

We need a great debate—not just about Viet Nam, but about Asian policy in general. I do not think we really have an Asian policy—that is a well thought out concept of our relationship with Asia. We lack an overall understanding of the problem we face there, the relationships of our influence and the potentialities the Asians themselves possess.

Decisions have been made country by country and case by case. Small and seemingly reasonable steps have been taken to meet specific, immediate problems, but sometimes these little steps have led us by slight imperceptible terms away from our objective. This is the way we stumbled into the blind alley of our present Viet Nam policy.

One does not need to be an expert on Asia to sense the logic of what Ambassador Reischauer writes.

It is vitally important that the American people know more about Asia, that greater thought be given by our leaders and legislators as to America's future course in Asia.

I would ask the people in the galleries, the people on the farms, the people in the cities and suburbs of our Nation to give greater thought to Asia, because Asia will play an increasingly important role to all of us Americans.

It is vitally important because America was called upon in 1950 to send troops to Korea where we suffered 33,629 battle deaths and 103,284 wounded.

Now, 17 years later, we are even more deeply involved militarily in southeast Asia, where we have more ground troops than we had at the height of the Korean war.

In Vietnam, we have roughly 435,000 American servicemen, plus 65,000 aboard ship in southeast Asian waters, plus another 42,000 American military men in Thailand.

So we are deeply and heavily involved with manpower in southeast Asia.

During 1966, the United States suffered 35,000 battle casualties—dead and wounded.

For the first 3 months of 1967, total American casualties have been running at the rate of about 1,300 per week, which on an annual basis would mean that we will have suffered about 65,000 casualties during 1967.

Historically, the people of the United States have been oriented toward Europe rather than toward Asia. Consequently, the American public has given little thought to American involvement in Asia.

The decision has been left to the leaders.

The commitments have been made in the name of the American people yet without the people or their representatives having had an opportunity to pass on the wisdom of the commitments until the involvement becomes so deep that our opportunities of action are limited and unsatisfactory.

One step leads to another, one gesture of friendship and help leads to additional commitments until we find ourselves as we do today, fully and deeply involved with resources and manpower in the problems of a country situated 12,000 miles from Washington—just about as far away as one can possibly get.

But our involvement in Asia does not stop with Vietnam.

In order to help the war effort there, we have negotiated with Thailand and have constructed, or are in the process of constructing, four huge military bases there, each of which I visited.

These bases are of great importance to the American military effort in Vietnam.

For example, our giant B-52 bombers heretofore all flown from Guam—a 12-hour round trip to target—will, beginning this month, be operated partially, from Thailand—a 4-hour round trip flight to target.

But our presence in Thailand further commits us in Asia, and it commits us to protect the Kingdom of Thailand.

Visualize, if you will, the map. Vietnam is separated from Thailand by both Laos and Cambodia. In other words, Laos and Cambodia lie between the two countries in which we are currently militarily involved.

The ultimate fate of Laos and Cambodia hangs in doubt with Communist pressure at a high point.

A part of Laos is now an important military base for the Vietcong; yet, another part of Laos is cooperating with the United States.

Cambodia claims to be neutral and will not permit the United States to overfly it when U.S. planes go from Thailand to Vietnam. Yet Cambodia is also a sanctuary for the Vietcong.

Sooner or later our Nation may be faced with grave decisions regarding Laos and Cambodia.

If such is the case and we decide to intervene, we will then have assumed the responsibility for all of what was French Indochina, plus its neighbor, the Kingdom of Thailand. If we conclude not to intervene in Laos and Cambodia, either or both could become another Communist-dominated North Vietnam.

What about the Asians themselves? What do the Asians think about American involvement in Vietnam?

The most important Asian nation economically is Japan.

Japan is not participating in the Vietnam conflict.

Except for occasional friendly state-

ments by Prime Minister Sato, virtually no voice is raised in behalf of the United States. In fact, whatever comments are made in Japan regarding the Vietnam war are hostile to U.S. involvement.

What about the two largest Asian nations, Communist China and India?

China, as we know, is supplying most of the small arms and food for the North Vietnamese and Vietcong; and India, a nation which should have learned its bitter lesson from Red China, frowns on U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

Of the smaller Asian nations, aside from Thailand, we are getting major help only from Korea. That nation is supplying 47,000 troops—and a good fighting lot they are.

The Philippines have made a friendly gesture by sending 2,500 engineers to Vietnam. Additionally, we are getting some help from Australia and New Zealand, two non-Asian nations.

Our high officials like to say that Vietnam is being defended by free world forces. But, as a practical matter, the only free world forces involved in major magnitude are the United States and Korea, and, considering its size, Australia.

As I see it, one of the great weaknesses of our struggle in Vietnam is that our Government has been unable to obtain effective support from the Asian nations, or from the 44 nations with whom we have mutual defense agreements, or from the United Nations, to which we have contributed millions for the maintenance of world peace.

For the most part our so-called friends have turned cold shoulders and have even aided the enemy with trade. I point out here that during the past 4 months, 20 ships flying the flag of Great Britain have carried commodities and materials into the North Vietnamese port of Haiphong.

I talked with many responsible U.S. military leaders and civilian leaders while I was in those Far Eastern countries. Virtually none see an early end to our involvement in Vietnam. Most feel that our military involvement could go on for quite a while, perhaps several years.

All feel that our involvement in the so-called pacification program, or social revolution in Vietnam, is a long-range one which could keep large numbers of Americans in Vietnam for 15 to 20 years.

If, in the meanwhile, we face another "Vietnam" in Asia, one can readily see that the drain on our manpower and our economic resources will be tremendous. Already the Vietnam war has cost American taxpayers at least \$40 billion.

The buildup in Vietnam—starting from scratch—has been accomplished in the amazingly short time of 18 months.

Today the construction capability is sufficient to duplicate the eight-lane circumferential highway around Washington, D.C., every 60 days, or pour another Hoover Dam in 11 months. The asphalt paving capacity is enough to rebuild the 118-mile Jersey Turnpike each month.

In one year the amount of rock crushed could fill enough railroad cars to make a train almost 1,000 miles long. The combined earthmoving and dredging capability is enough to excavate a new

100-mile-long Suez Canal in a year and a half.

These abilities exist simultaneously and have been developed in spite of monsoons, limited lines of communications and the widespread activities of a determined enemy. They dramatize, too, the great industrial might of the United States, built on the free enterprise system.

But economic cost is not my prime concern.

What concerns me so deeply is American involvement with manpower, and the heavy casualties we are suffering in the most unusual war the United States has ever fought.

It is not war as we knew it in World War I or World War II, or even in the Korean war. It is a guerrilla type of war to which Asians are well suited and to which their terrain is well adapted.

It is a war in which we send the world's best equipped fighter planes and bombers costing more than \$2 million each to bomb or strafe inexpensive targets like a truck or a remote roadbed.

Vietnam today has on its soil more than 1 million military personnel—435,000 Americans, 47,000 Koreans, about 10,000 from various other nations, and 620,000 members of the South Vietnamese armed forces.

Geographically, South Vietnam is 65,000 square miles—almost exactly the combined size of the States of Virginia and West Virginia.

Visualize the placing of more than 1 million soldiers in the two Virginias and one can then visualize something of the situation in South Vietnam, and the inherent problems of such an arrangement.

Whenever responsible Senators such as the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS], the Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON], or the Senator from Washington [Mr. JACKSON] urge that the supply routes of the enemy be cut, the cry goes up that this would escalate the war.

We hear much about a limited war—but for the American people, is it really a limited war?

It is limited as to expansion beyond the borders of Vietnam; it is limited insofar as obtaining help from other nations; it is limited in what our military commanders are permitted to do in stemming the flow of supplies to the enemy—but the war has been greatly widened so far as the American people are concerned.

Let us see where the real escalation has occurred.

The true escalation of the Vietnamese war has taken place on the ground within South Vietnam. Two years ago we had 29,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam; today we have 435,000, not counting the 42,000 in Thailand or the 65,000 aboard ships.

So the war has been greatly escalated for the American people, and the sacrifices their sons are asked to make.

Two weeks in southeast Asia dramatized to me that our southeast Asia involvement is deeper than it appears on the surface and is more complicated and

more difficult than most Americans realize.

So long as U.S. forces fight in Vietnam, I feel it important that several steps be taken by our Government:

First. That the military commanders in the field should be given the authority to cut the enemy supply lines and attack vital military targets in North Vietnam if, in the judgment of the military leaders, it is necessary to do so to protect American troops.

The restrictions we have placed on our fighting men have permitted the enemy to build up its forces in North Vietnam, and to accumulate surface-to-air missiles, heavy artillery, heavy antiaircraft weapons and the oil to prosecute the war. Virtually all of the sophisticated weapons have come from the Soviet Union.

While with Carrier Task Force 77, I observed the launch and recovery of a night raid into North Vietnam. I later talked with two young A6 Intruder Bomber pilots who barely escaped from the target area after evading surface-to-air missiles which might well have been destroyed on the docks of Haiphong days earlier. Additionally, our pilots must contend with Mig fighters which contest them from sanctuary airfields.

The unwillingness to hit important military targets in North Vietnam has prolonged the war and increased our casualties, and in the future will increase our casualties even more.

Second. Our Government must not agree to "pauses" in military operations, such as we did for 6 days in February, unless it can be assured that the enemy will not use the cessation to consolidate his forces and to build his supplies.

The facts show that the 6-day February pause resulted in the transporting of more than 40,000 tons of material from North Vietnam to South Vietnam for the purpose of supplying the Vietcong.

Such a quantity of material is adequate to supply two Vietcong divisions for 6 months. Undoubtedly, additional American casualties resulted from the 6-day pause.

Third. I think it vital that our Government concentrate on getting support in the way of combat troops from other Asian nations. Supposedly, we are fighting to keep Asia free from communism. If such is the case, the Asians themselves should participate fully with manpower in this endeavor.

This is the third major war in which the United States has become involved in the short space of 25 years, and two of these—Korea and Vietnam—have been in Asia.

It is time—indeed, well past time—for our Government to begin a diplomatic offensive toward obtaining effective help from other nations to the end that America will not be fighting an Asian war virtually alone.

This, Mr. President, is my appraisal of conditions as I observed them in southeast Asia.

If we continue to restrict our military leaders in their missions, if we do not press for greater assistance from Asian nations, and from our allies elsewhere, then the American people have the right

to know that we face a long, costly struggle.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I yield.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I commend the distinguished Senator from Virginia for the very fine statement he is making.

I know that the report he is now giving to the Senate—which he has also given to the members of the Committee on Armed Services—will be extremely helpful.

During the short time that the Senator has been a member of the Armed Services Committee, he has made a number of fine contributions.

I commend him for the forceful and effective report that he is giving to the Senate.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, I am grateful to my friend, the distinguished and able Senator from Washington, for his generous and kind remarks.

The Senator from Washington is one of the senior members of the Senate and a senior member of the Armed Services Committee. He is one of the most knowledgeable men on military problems in the entire Congress.

I am most grateful for his comments.

Mr. President, I am convinced that a long war is to the advantage of the Soviet Union and Communist China.

I am convinced, too, that a long war will drain American resources and American manpower.

For that reason, I feel the logical course for the United States to follow is to conduct the war in such a way as to bring it to the earliest possible conclusion.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I yield.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, the Senator from Virginia has made a thought-provoking speech. As usual, he has demonstrated his willingness to meet head-on the issue of the day.

I note that in his third recommended step to be taken by our Government, he states his belief that it is vital for us to concentrate on getting support in the way of combat troops from other Asian nations.

Is the Senator aware of the number of casualties that the South Koreans have had since the beginning of the war?

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I do not have the precise figures at hand.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, as I understand, the total number of South Korean casualties is less than 1,000. That figure includes all the killed, wounded, and missing. It is also my understanding that the South Koreans are not engaged in combat activities in the war. Is my understanding correct?

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. The South Koreans have in Vietnam a total force of 47,000.

I am not aware of their total number of casualties. I must say that I do feel that the Republic of South Korea has done, and is doing, its full share of participation in this matter, which is more than can be said for most of the other nations.

Mr. HARTKE. The Philippines have in Vietnam a contingent of 1,000 men. They are also engaged in construction work.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. The figure I have reflects that 2,500 men from the Philippines are in Vietnam. They are engaged in engineering. They are not offensive troops. They are there for construction purposes.

Mr. HARTKE. The Australians have roughly 4,000 men in Vietnam.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. The Australians have between 5,000 and 6,000 men in Vietnam. I am inclined to think that is a pretty good force for a nation the size of Australia.

Mr. HARTKE. How many men from New Zealand are in Vietnam?

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. A couple of hundred. The Thai are not actually participating in the sense of supplying military manpower, but they are very cooperative so far as the use of their territory is concerned.

Mr. HARTKE. Besides the countries I have mentioned, no other nations are involved in the struggle.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I do not think there are any others. Spain has an ambulance unit there. However, so far as effective participation is concerned, the Senator from Indiana is quite correct.

Mr. HARTKE. So far as we are concerned, we have no cooperation from either of our immediate neighbors in this respect—that is, from Canada or Mexico; or from any North American country, any South American country, any African country, any European country, or any Asian nations except Korea and the Philippines, and the limited Thai support.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Unfortunately the distinguished Senator from Indiana is correct.

One of the great weaknesses in the struggle in Vietnam and one of the great weaknesses of our Government is that we have not been able to get effective help. As the Senator from Indiana has pointed out, our Government has not been able to get effective help from its allies. We have mutual defense agreements with 44 nations. They would expect us to come to their defense, but we are getting very little help from them.

Mr. HARTKE. And many of the nations with which we have the agreements are those to which we are still providing foreign aid—military and economic aid.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Indeed, we are.

In this connection, there comes to mind the Asian nation of India, to which we are supplying—and have for many years supplied—large amounts of foodstuffs. This year Congress passed legislation to send much food to India, which we are happy to do, to prevent certain areas of that nation from starving. But I cannot help feeling that the American people deserve greater consideration at the hands of their friends and allies.

Mr. HARTKE. It is important to keep these facts in mind as we discuss this matter.

The Senator from Virginia has delivered a very thoughtful speech.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I am grateful to the Senator from Indiana.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I am glad to yield to the able Senator from West Virginia.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I thank the senior Senator from Virginia for the report he has brought to the Senate today. The Senator from Virginia is a diligent, conscientious, active and able member of the Committee on Armed Services. He participates in the hearings conducted by that committee. He faithfully follows the discussions that are held upon matters which come before that committee, and he participates in an active and competent manner.

The Senator from Virginia has performed a service to the country by visiting South Vietnam and by submitting a very detailed report about his visit. I hope that Senators will read his report; that the people in the administration also will read it. The Senator has made a fine contribution. Though I have not had the opportunity to listen to the entire speech, I have heard a part of it, and I intend to read it when it appears in the RECORD.

I congratulate the distinguished Senator from Virginia and I repeat that he has performed a very real service, not only to the Senate but also to the country.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. The Senator from West Virginia is much too kind and too generous, but I am grateful to him.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I am glad to yield to the senior Senator from Ohio.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I desire to commend the Senator from Virginia for his able presentation of his views about what the course of our Nation should be in South Vietnam.

Statements of the character made by the Senator from Virginia and other Members of the Senate within the last 3 weeks will help much to clarify the minds of the public of the United States about what genuinely and truly is at stake in South Vietnam. The true picture has not been impressed upon the people of our Nation. Too many of our citizens are of the opinion that we are unjustifiably and improperly intervening in a matter which is of no concern to the United States. That opinion has been spread, it has been accepted, and it has produced an inordinate number of dead and bodily injured, because it has convinced Ho Chi Minh that we are divided, that we will pull out.

The Senator from Virginia has been in South Vietnam. He subscribes fully to the course that has been followed by our Government, except that he believes that we should hit the military forces of the enemy with greater constancy and greater force.

President Truman, President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, President Johnson, every Secretary of State since President Truman's administration, and every Secretary of Defense since President Truman's administration have taken the position that we cannot afford to allow the Communists to take over

South Vietnam by aggression. To me, the issue is not that we are solely trying to give the South Vietnamese the right—by open, free, public elections—to choose the type of government they want. The issue goes beyond that. It is related to the threat of communism by aggression, and thus eventually to a threat to the very security of our Nation.

I commend the Senator from Virginia for his able presentation. I repeat on the floor of the Senate what I said to the Senator in person on a number of occasions since he came to the Senate: Senator BYRD of Virginia is a valuable addition to this parliamentary body; and I am aware that his father, for whom I had such deep respect and affection, would be proud and honored to know of the high quality of service that his successor is rendering for the people of Virginia and for the people of the United States.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, I wish to express my very deep appreciation for what the Senator from Ohio has said. He is very kind and generous, and I am deeply grateful.

I wish to comment about one statement made by the Senator from Ohio—the unification of the American people to accomplish the objective of bringing this war to an honorable conclusion.

There may be differences as to how this objective can best be accomplished, but I am convinced that the American people are united in the determination that this war be brought to a successful conclusion and, I hope, to an early conclusion.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Will the Senator further yield?

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I am glad to yield.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I have disagreed with certain policies of the President, but I cannot help expressing my admiration and inspiration with respect to the efforts that the President has made: first, to be firm, and second, to try with all his might to bring the shooting to an end honorably, in the interest of the United States and in the general interest of all the people of the world.

The President has attempted, through every means conceivable, to induce Ho Chi Minh to come to the negotiating table. Ho Chi Minh, however, is convinced that we are so divided that we will abandon honor and will pull out.

The longer the arguments are made about stopping the bombing, others saying that we should pull out, the greater will be the number of fatalities and casualties resulting from the war.

Ho Chi Minh's hope lies in the conviction that we will quit, that we will surrender, and that we will allow the Communists to take hold of South Vietnam and then move southward, move into Africa, move into South America, and thus further threaten the security of the United States.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. In holding such a view, I am certain Ho Chi Minh does not understand or realize the feelings of the people of the United States.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.

HARRIS in the chair). The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

REHABILITATION: KEY TO SOLVING THE HOUSING CRISIS

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, last night I was to have made what I consider to be a very important speech to the National Housing Conference, which had its concluding banquet in Washington. Due to the fact that my plane was late in arriving, the gathering could not wait for me. Hence, I failed to make the speech at that time. Inasmuch as I consider the subject of this speech a matter of very real and pressing interest to the Congress, because it raises a major issue as to how to deal with the crisis in the cities, I am making the speech today.

Mr. President, the fundamental thesis I wish to espouse is that the crisis of the cities is so urgent and is pressing upon us so heavily that instead of taking the optimum course to deal with that phase of it which relates to housing, we have to take a more accelerated course. After considerable examination and study I have come to the conclusion that the most measurable immediate progress which can be made is in the area of renovation and rehabilitation of existing structures rather than construction of new housing.

Mr. President, first I wish to make it clear that I support new housing for the ghettos, and that I support the ideas for housing ownership by ghetto dwellers. However, in that belief, which my friend, the Senator from Illinois [Mr. PERCY] is strongly advocating in a fine bill which he has introduced, I do not recede from my position in the housing field.

We are talking about the fact that the housing situation in the slums and ghettos will not wait for the optimum solution. While I do not believe that the solution which I propose is the complete solution, it is a way in which to accelerate a material start which, in my judgment, can have a profound effect upon the situation.

Sociologically, unless we deal with this subject and move into it in a way to act promptly, I feel it will enormously complicate the problems of racial tensions and public order which we find now beginning in the ghetto and slum structures, something which did not characterize these dwellings in other days, but does today.

Therefore, I present this proposal to the Senate in the sense of a state of urgency. We can do so now without blocking off or stopping the highly desirable activities with regard to ownership to which I have referred.

The much talked about "crisis of the cities" is essentially a crisis of the spreading slums and ghettos. To make the massive and immediate attack on this problem that is necessary, we must devise methods of utilizing to the fullest ren-

ovation and rehabilitation of existing structures; we cannot wait for solutions by urban renewal, or all new housing, or all new cities.

With the proper legislation and administration, I estimate that it would be possible to bring about decent and sanitary housing in not less than 50 percent of the existing structures in slums and ghettos through renovation and rehabilitation.

The problem before us must be dealt with on a massive scale. Rehabilitation and renovation are suited to private enterprise solutions, especially those involving civic action by business groups joined with nonprofit organizations to engage in massive projects in the multimillion-dollar class.

This must be our objective, and the plan I propose must be able to pass the test of being capable of attracting this kind of massive approach.

Before I outline my thinking on this problem, let us survey the problem itself. Statistics on the problem of urban housing are more staggering than eloquence.

The 1960 Census of Housing declared that 4.3 million urban units, or about 10 percent of the entire inventory, are substandard. We know that the rural slums, in many cases, are just as deplorable, if not more so. In New York City alone, estimates are that in 1965 there were still 43,000 old-law tenements built prior to 1901 containing approximately 1 million persons—as many people as the entire population of Baltimore. For 30 years—since the Housing Act of 1937—we have been trying to assure decent, safe, and sanitary housing for all our citizens. Yet, we must face the fact that in all that time we have not caught up with the problem. We have failed dismally. Even where we have made a small dent in the problem, the concept and design of the housing fell far short of balancing individual and community needs.

For all our progress, the slum dweller still lives in the midst of burgeoning economic and financial centers, with no great hope of attaining the prize of American life—a good home—any more than the Appalachian farmer, or the Indian in his adobe hut on the reservation. Ironically, the slum dweller's proximity to wealth makes his condition even more desperate. Thus, we have to fashion a program that can make an impact now.

There are three ways of attacking the problem of housing in the big cities: First, urban renewal, including both new construction and rehabilitation; second, new construction alone; and third, rehabilitation alone. Of course, we need programs encompassing both rehabilitation and new construction, but, in my view, we have not nearly recognized the possibilities of rehabilitation unconnected with urban renewal. There is room for initiatives without having to bring the whole lumbering machinery of urban renewal into operation.

What about the rehabilitation program now on the books?

There is a loan program and a grant program, and neither has significant impact. If our concern were to fix the small private home of the low-income