

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be received, printed, and appropriately referred.

The amendment (No. 350) was referred to the Committee on Finance.

ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY AMENDMENTS OF 1967—AMENDMENTS

AMENDMENT NO. 341

Mr. CURTIS submitted an amendment, intended to be proposed by him to the bill (S. 2388) to provide an improved Economic Opportunity Act, to authorize funds for the continued operation of economic opportunity programs, to authorize an Emergency Employment Act, and for other purposes, which was ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

AMENDMENT NO. 342

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, on behalf of myself, the Senator from California [Mr. MURPHY], and the Senator from Arizona [Mr. FANNIN], I submit an amendment, intended to be proposed by us, jointly, to Senate bill 2388, supra, which would transfer Headstart from the Office of Economic Opportunity to the Office of Education, and ask that it be printed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be received, printed, and will lie on the table.

AMENDMENT NO. 343

Mr. MONTOYA (for himself and Mr. ANDERSON) proposed an amendment to Senate bill 2388, supra, which was ordered to be printed.

AMENDMENTS NOS. 344, 345, AND 346

Mr. MONTOYA (for himself and Mr. ANDERSON) submitted three amendments, intended to be proposed by them, jointly, to Senate bill 2388, supra, which were ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

AMENDMENT NO. 347

Mr. MILLER submitted an amendment, intended to be proposed by him, to Senate bill 2388, supra, which was ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

AMENDMENTS NOS. 348 AND 349

Mr. MONRONEY submitted two amendments, intended to be proposed by him, to Senate bill 2388, supra, which were ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

SOCIAL SECURITY AMENDMENTS OF 1967—AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 350

Mr. LONG of Louisiana submitted an amendment, intended to be proposed by him, to the bill (H.R. 12080) to amend the Social Security Act to provide an increase in benefits under the old-age, survivors, and disability insurance system, to provide benefits for additional categories of individuals, to improve the public assistance program and programs relating to the welfare and health of children, and for other purposes, which was referred to the Committee on Finance and ordered to be printed.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILLS AND AMENDMENT

Mr. MONTOYA. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at its next printing, the name of the Senator from Montana [Mr. METCALF] be added as a cosponsor of my bill, S. 2263, the Cooperative Rural Fire Protection Act.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MONTOYA. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent that at its next printing, the names of the Senators from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND], from Montana [Mr. METCALF], from Minnesota [Mr. MONDALE], from New York [Mr. JAVITS], and from Michigan [Mr. HART] be added as cosponsors of my amendment No. 265 (S. 17). This is an amendment to H.R. 12080, the proposed Social Security Amendments of 1967, to provide coverage of certain drugs under medicare.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, at its next printing, the name of the senior Senator from Michigan [Mr. HART] be added as a cosponsor of S. 2415, the Marine Sanctuaries Study Act of 1967.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President on behalf of the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. MONDALE], I ask unanimous consent that, at its next printing, the name of the Senator from Maryland [Mr. TYDINGS] be added as a cosponsor of the bill (S. 2218) to clarify and otherwise amend the Meat Inspection Act, to provide for cooperation with appropriate State agencies with respect to State meat inspection programs, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ENROLLED BILL PRESENTED

The Secretary of the Senate reported that on today, September 26, 1967, he presented to the President of the United States the enrolled bill (S. 188) creating a commission to be known as the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography.

NOTICE OF HEARING ON NOMINATION BEFORE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, on behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary, I desire to give notice that a public hearing has been scheduled for Tuesday, October 3, 1967, at 10:30 a.m., in room 2228, New Senate Office Building, on the following nomination:

Damon J. Keith, of Michigan, to be U.S. district judge, eastern district of Michigan, vice Thomas P. Thornton, retired.

At the indicated time and place persons interested in the above nomination may make such representations as may be pertinent.

The subcommittee consists of the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. BURDICK],

chairman; the Senator from Indiana [Mr. BAYH], and the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. SCOTT].

THE TONKIN GULF RESOLUTION

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, for those observers of the passing scene to whom politics is little more than a cheap game in which one man or one group tries to advantage itself at the expense of another, the distress of Congress over the administration's continuing misuse of the Tonkin Gulf resolution means only that a crafty President has again put it over on the stupid Members of Congress.

How stupid you Members are and were, they say, not to have known that Lyndon Johnson would extract the last ounce of advantage from the situation he so cleverly put you in.

What this glib view so conveniently ignores, however, is that the American political system requires mutual confidence and trust between the President and Congress, just as it requires confidence on the part of the people in the President and Congress.

This is important in tranquil times. It is essential in times of stress like the present. Yet, in somber fact, the Johnson administration's handling of the war in Vietnam since 1964 has produced a crisis of confidence.

The basis anxiety of Americans, in and out of Congress, by no means rests solely on the rising casualty lists or the increased money cost of the war or its diversion of resources and energy from urgent domestic needs—critical as these are.

The people's anxiety, and that of Congress, too, springs perhaps in greatest part from a growing conviction that the administration is not telling them the truth.

I have pointed out before that the administration's continuing assurances of progress in Vietnam simply do not square with the cold fact that toward our basic objective—that of creating an independent self-governing society supported by its citizens—there has been no significant progress at all.

This week, for example, U.S. News & World Report, in a well-balanced appraisal of the Vietnam war, points up the continuing failure of the South Vietnamese to do the job only they can do—to bring security to the countryside. The writer concludes that "unless there are major changes in the way things are going—particularly, changes in the South Vietnamese Army—the United States will continue to be dragged steadily into a long, frustrating job of occupation."

I ask unanimous consent that the article, entitled "A Fresh Look at the Vietnam War," be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered. (See exhibit 1.)

Mr. CASE. Recently, the clash between administration words and deeds has enveloped the bombing issue. On August 25, Secretary McNamara, in stating the case for a policy of limited bombing of North Vietnam, argued persuasively that at-

tacks on the ports of North Vietnam "would not be an effective means of stopping the infiltration of supplies into South Vietnam."

We were assured, moreover, that the Secretary was speaking for the President in this regard—I was involved in this colloquy myself—both by the White House and the majority leader of the Senate. Shortly thereafter, however, heavy attacks were launched against targets in two of North Vietnam's three major ports.

Has Secretary McNamara been overruled by the President? It may not be so, but it looks that way. An alternative assumption is even more ominous—that the President, whatever his own attitude toward the need for restraint, is indulging the proponents of a "military solution" in Vietnam for political reasons.

Today I wish to call attention to another example of what one prominent correspondent has called the Johnson administration's "operation behind a false front." This concerns the interpretation given by the President and his advisers to the joint resolution passed by the Congress on August 7, 1964—the so-called Tonkin Gulf resolution.

That resolution, it will be recalled, was presented to Congress by the President in an atmosphere of emergency. American naval vessels, we were told, had been attacked off North Vietnam, and the President had ordered a retaliatory raid against "gunboats and supporting facilities used in these hostile operations."

Therefore—

Said the President—

I have concluded that I should now ask the Congress, on its part, to join in affirming the national determination that all such attacks will be met, and that the United States will continue in its basic policy of assisting the free nations of the area to defend their freedom.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. NELSON in the chair). The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 3 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CASE. The resolution that we then adopted, with only two dissenting votes in the Senate and none in the House, stated:

Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

It further stated that the United States is "prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom."

The Members of Congress knew the wording of the resolution. They knew that the naked words could be construed to give the President almost complete sanction to involve the United States militarily in anything he considered

necessary to the national interest in Southeast Asia.

That, however, was not the Nation's understanding of administration intentions in the summer of 1964. To the contrary, it was the understanding of Congress and of the public that it was our basic policy to "assist" South Vietnam and that, as the President put it in September, he was not about to send American boys to fight a war that Asian boys should fight for themselves.

The Members of Congress were, in fact, given specific assurance that the Tonkin Gulf resolution was not intended to grant the unlimited sanction which, stretched to their ultimate, the words could be taken to convey. They had specific assurance on this point from Senator FULBRIGHT, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, who persuaded Senator NELSON not to offer an amendment to bar "extension of the present conflict."

Such a proviso was unnecessary, Senator FULBRIGHT told us, because the objective sought was an "accurate reflection of what I believe is the President's policy." Senator FULBRIGHT was then known to be a confidant of the President, and the authority of his words was unchallenged. And if Senator FULBRIGHT had asserted, to the contrary, that Congress was being asked to approve a fundamental change in our role in Vietnam, the administration "would have repudiated him out of hand," as Senator NELSON stated the other day on the floor of the Senate.

There was, moreover, the President's own suggestion that the expression of support he sought from Congress was limited in time, no less than in scope. For this is how he concluded his message of August 5, 1964:

The events of this week would in any event make the passage of a Congressional resolution essential. But there is an additional reason for doing so at a time when we are entering on three months of political campaigning. Hostile nations must understand that in such a period the United States will continue to protect its national interests, and that in these matters there is no division among us.

Those 3 months have stretched into 3 years, yet we still find the President relying upon the literal words of the Tonkin Gulf resolution to justify every action he has taken in Vietnam—actions that have raised the number of Americans engaged from a few thousand to more than one-half million, have initiated and expanded the bombing of North Vietnam, and have turned this into a largely American war with no end in sight.

Only recently, on August 18, the President told his news conference:

I believe that every Congressman and most of the Senators knew what that resolution said. That resolution authorized the President—and expressed the Congress' willingness to go along with the President—to do whatever was necessary to deter aggression.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator may proceed for an additional 5 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CASE. I thank the Senator. I hope I do not use that much time.

Mr. President, this is a complete distortion of what Congress understood and intended by its action 3 years ago. It amounts to a claim that we gave Mr. Johnson a perpetual letter of credit, which no Congress can or would do.

We knew quite well what we were doing when we adopted the Tonkin Gulf resolution. We were not wrong, nor were we stupid, in acting in reliance on the essential element in all relations between the President and the Congress—mutual trust and confidence.

When we relied on the assurance given us by Senator FULBRIGHT for the administration, we were acting in the only way in which we could act, consistent with the need to make the American political system work in times of emergency.

For the President to take advantage of the restraint and responsibility of Congress in this situation has been, I think, highly irresponsible. It amounts to reckless tampering with the most fragile of all the essential ingredients of a democratic society, the trust of one man for another.

And the President compounds his error when he deliberately taunts the Congress with a dare to repeal the resolution. Such a step would amount to a vote of "no confidence," which in a parliamentary system would produce a change of government, but would only produce chaos under our system of fixed terms of office. Congress will not indulge in such recklessness, and Mr. Johnson knows it.

If the potential consequences of his misrepresentations were no more than the undoing of one political leader, the damage to our system might not be so serious. But the President has done more than to squander his credibility; he has dealt a grievous blow at the process by which we have arrived at the expression of national unity in the face of international crises since the Second World War.

The "sense of Congress" resolution has served an invaluable purpose in this respect under President Truman, President Eisenhower, and President Kennedy. But President Johnson's perversion of the Tonkin Gulf resolution has so undermined the mutual confidence and trust upon which this technique was built that its future utility may have been irreparably compromised.

EXHIBIT 1

[From U.S. News & World Report, Sept. 25, 1967]

DISPATCH FROM SAIGON—A FRESH LOOK AT THE VIETNAM WAR

(NOTE.—This is the report of a veteran foreign correspondent who has just taken his first look at Vietnam—its people, the countryside, the war.

(James N. Wallace, of the International Staff of "U.S. News & World Report," spent a month traveling and observing in Vietnam, and came up with some surprising discoveries about a war unlike any the United States ever fought before.)

SAIGON.—In an air-conditioned office here, a U.S. Army colonel, shouting over the roar of a portable generator outside the window, ticks off a list of "intelligence indicators"

pointing to a definite—and favorable—turn in the war.

In a sweltering makeshift headquarters hut, another U.S. Army officer, wearing only undershorts and combat boots, wipes drops of sweat off a map and tells a visitor: "We've been losing a little ground in the past few weeks; Charlie is proving he can still blow up almost anything he wants, just about when he wants."

At Da Nang, a coastal town that has been a focal point of the Vietnamese struggle for 20 years, a Marine corporal scrubs yellow mud from the barrels of the recoilless rifles on an Ontos carrier and boasts: "The VC really hate this baby; they've never seen firepower like we lay on them."

And in another Vietnamese provincial capital, a U.S. civilian official frets:

"We still could lose this war because of corruption. We've proved we can beat the Communists militarily, but if we can't lick corruption all the effort will be wasted."

To a newcomer, these four isolated bits of conversation seem to picture faithfully the shape and status of the Vietnam war as another autumn's fighting begins, even while there is talk around the world of peace negotiations.

These conversations, plus dozens of similar incidents, tell a great deal about what has been accomplished in Vietnam, what has failed, and what still must be done before anything like "victory" can be claimed.

The war in Vietnam, seen for the first time up close, is far different from—and vastly more difficult than—anything this correspondent had been prepared for. But the differences and difficulties, here in the war zone itself, have relatively little to do with the bitter dispute in the U.S. between "hawks" pressing for greatly stepped-up bombing of North Vietnam and "doves" urging the U.S. to get out of Vietnam at almost any price.

The things that strike the mind and imagination here are the hard realities of a war unlike any the U.S. has ever fought before, and of a country that sometimes seems possessed by an almost perverse determination to destroy itself.

Travel a month through Vietnam, from flooded rice fields in the Mekong Delta to steaming mountain jungles, from huge military bases to lonely sentry outposts, and you come away with a whole new set of impressions of what the war and the country are really like.

Among the sharpest of these impressions: *The size and scope of the U.S. military effort.*

Vietnam is variously called a guerrilla war, a jungle war, or a limited war. It is all of those things, but a great deal more. Increasingly, about the only "limit" is the absence of nuclear weapons. By any other measure—manpower, weapons, firepower, casualties, cost—Vietnam seems destined to equal or exceed any similar-sized theater of World War II.

The sophistication and power of the enemy.

From afar, the Communist forces are often imagined as bands of black-pajama-clad guerrillas, raiding by night and hiding by day. In reality, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces are tightly organized, well-armed, professionally led armies. The Viet Cong do make primitive mantraps from sharpened and poisoned bamboo stakes. But they also use 140-mm. rockets, field hospitals, voucher systems for supplies, even a postal service.

The difficulty of the terrain that's being fought over.

Picture-book Vietnam is a water-logged field, a peasant farmer wearing a cone-shaped straw hat, and perhaps a Buddhist temple in the background. But more than half the country actually is rugged, jungle-choked hills, some over a mile high. Often the jungle cover is so thick a company of in-

fantrymen is invisible from a helicopter hovering only 200 feet above.

The vast disruption of the war.

Almost one out of every eight South Vietnamese is or recently has been a refugee. A few quit their farms and homes because of Communist pressure. Most are simply fleeing the fighting. South Vietnam was once a major rice exporter. Now 700,000 tons a year is brought in from the U.S. Even in villages surrounded on every side by rice fields, you see grain from Louisiana and Texas.

Along with impressions, a month's travel and talks with scores of Americans and Vietnamese begin to produce some ideas about Vietnam's basic questions: Is the war stalemated or progressing? What will it take for real victory? Can South Vietnam's own Army be made into an effective fighting force? How is the "other war" for reform and economic development going? Have thousands of lives and billions of dollars bought anything worthwhile in Vietnam?

You quickly learn that in some Saigon offices "stalemate" is now a dirty word. On one occasion, most of a half hour with a military planner was chewed up by sharp, almost angry, denials that "stalemate" was a proper description of the war in Vietnam.

It is true that a U.S. military commander can, if he wants to, pick any spot in South Vietnam, overwhelm, occupy and "secure" it. Except near the 37-mile-long Demilitarized Zone—the DMZ—separating North and South Vietnam, Communist forces simply cannot match U.S. firepower, manpower and mobility.

But it is equally true that no place in South Vietnam is beyond the reach of sudden, devastating Viet Cong raids or mortar attacks. The Communists proved this again on August 27 with almost simultaneous mortar barrages on seven different towns in widely separated parts of the country.

There are no front lines or safe rear areas anywhere, a fact that U.S. troops seldom forget for long. An artillery sergeant on a hilltop near the tiny village of Mo Duc comments: "You know, there's just no place around where you can sit down and drink a beer without knowing Charlie might drop one down your shirt collar."

To a nonmilitary newcomer, the "stalemate" question is a matter of over-all momentum, not of ability to occupy a valley or mortar a town. In recent weeks, neither side in Vietnam has shown convincing signs of winning or holding momentum. Perhaps the best assessment comes from a non-American adviser in Saigon who has watched Southeast Asia for 20 years, both as a military officer and as a civilian. His comment:

"The war isn't going especially badly for the Americans, nor especially well. It is just not going. There's no sense of movement, and it can be dangerous when you lose that. It is much harder to get things going again—and it costs a lot more—than to keep going."

"After the battle." More important than the current "stalemate" argument in the long run is the question of what happens in Vietnamese valleys, towns and rice-growing hamlets after the shooting battle for any particular piece of real estate is over and won. At the end of a trip through Vietnam, three things about this "after the battle" question seem discouragingly clear:

(1) The only really "secure" or "pacified" places in Vietnam are places where U.S. units are physically present, in force.

(2) Far too often, U.S. forces sweep impressively through an area, killing or capturing hundreds of Communists, and then have to be pulled out to meet a threat someplace else. The Communists simply drift back in and reassume control over the local population.

(3) So, unless there are major changes in the way things are going—particularly, changes in the South Vietnamese Army—the

U.S. will continue to be dragged steadily into a long, frustrating job of occupation.

Over and over, when U.S. officers in the field are asked for an assessment of the future of their area, they reply with some version of, "It all depends on whether we stay here in force."

Around Nha Be, on the edge of the Delta, the once almost-unchallenged Viet Cong has been checkmated since the U.S. 199th Light Infantry Brigade moved in about eight months ago.

"They've managed to collect some taxes, but that's about all," explains a brigade intelligence officer. "There have been no assassinations, no kidnappings, no mines planted along the roads, no terrorism."

How was this accomplished? The officer answers:

"By having our line companies physically occupying the villages. The men are constantly out on saturation patrols. The people see them all the time; that's won confidence. Attitudes of whole villages are changing."

Outlook for peace. How long will it take to turn this confidence into a feeling of real peace and security?

"It may take five years of physical occupation," predicts the intelligence officer. "To win, you simply must stay here physically and hold the land. Kill Viet Cong when the opportunity presents itself, but hold the land."

"Unfortunately, in much of South Vietnam, U.S. forces do not go in to 'hold the land,' or at least not as long as many commanders in the field think will prove necessary.

The occupying chore—and very likely demands for still more American troops—is falling to the U.S. because of a combination of continuing Communist strength and the South Vietnamese Army's still unresolved disarray.

There's no doubting the Communists have been badly mauled since U.S. troops came to Vietnam in force in mid-1965. Almost all the "indicators" intelligence experts piece together to form a mosaic picture of the overall war situation show that the Viet Cong and their North Vietnamese backers are hurting.

The Communists have lost more than 200,000 killed and several times that number wounded in the past two years. By the end of July of this year, 20,398 persons had deserted the Communist forces and come over to the Government side—more than in all of 1966.

Larger numbers of women and teen-age boys showing up in the ranks of the Viet Cong, and even of the North Vietnamese Regular Army, indicate that Communist recruiting is becoming more difficult. Intercepted messages reveal recurrent shortages of food, medicine and ammunition. Captured documents indicate that fewer than a third of the North Vietnamese infiltrators starting down the Ho Chi Minh Trail reach their destinations in the South; bombing, disease and anti-infiltration patrols are taking a heavy toll.

Yet from the Delta to the DMZ, American officers, troops and civilian advisers agree that "Charlie" is still a tough, imaginative and formidable enemy.

"Charlie's" surprises. To a newcomer, briefed by Washington officials on the steady progress being made in Vietnam, there are many surprises in on-the-spot accounts of what the Communists still have in this country, and what they are able to do.

Despite all their losses, the Communists still have, by U.S. reckoning, more than 295,000 troops in South Vietnam—about as many as there ever have been.

Increasingly, these are North Vietnamese Regular Army troops. Like so much else about Vietnam, this can be rated a plus or a minus, depending on what you are trying to

prove. The influx of Northern regulars means the Viet Cong is having trouble maintaining itself through local recruiting. But it also means facing a better-trained, better-armed foe.

U.S. marines near the DMZ, who face North Vietnamese most regularly, have a healthy respect for the enemy. A private comments:

"When we were down around Chu Lai [about 90 miles south] we kept right on working when guerrilla snipers opened up. But man, up here, if you hear two sniper shots in succession you know somebody's been hit."

North Vietnamese regulars also are bringing bigger, more powerful weapons into the South. In recent weeks U.S. forces have been hit by 140-mm. and 120-mm. rockets, 120-mm. mortars, and an antitank gun known as the RPG 7, which is capable of piercing several inches of armor with a direct hit.

These and other weapons are Russian or Red Chinese models, sometimes modified for Vietnam. Most common modification is breaking down a weapon into small parts that can be carried along a jungle trail on a man's back.

New danger for helicopters. More worrisome to American commanders are still unconfirmed reports that newer, more accurate Soviet rockets and 37-mm. antiaircraft guns are appearing inside South Vietnam.

A major factor in U.S. military success in the South has been almost unhampered air power. Communists blaze away at the U.S. planes with rifles and machine guns, but only occasional lucky hits do real damage. Introduction of regular antiaircraft batteries, especially against helicopters, would pose sharp new dangers.

Watching jet fighter-bombers scream off the Da Nang airport runway, riding an armored personnel carrier down a provincial road or listening to B-52s unload tons of bombs onto a jungle target, you get the impression that Communist forces would be lucky simply to survive in South Vietnam.

But in just one recent week—and a "slow" one, at that—the Communists managed, in addition to numerous sharp fire fights, to:

Cut Highway 4 leading to Saigon in 22 places. Severing of this key supply route pushed Saigon food prices up 3 per cent in one week.

Build underground concrete bunkers in a half dozen Delta locations, despite daily U.S. patrolling.

Assassinate or kidnap 140 persons, including nine police officers, four hamlet chiefs and a deputy village chief.

Employ bulldozers and heavy trucks building roads into the A Chau Valley from Laos, a possible preliminary to an attack from the rear against Marine positions along the DMZ.

Needed: a better ARVN. Barring an unexpected Communist agreement to peace negotiations, the only apparent way the U.S. can avoid taking on at least a semioccupation role would be a major improvement, almost a complete renovation, of South Vietnam's own Army.

This is by no means impossible. Many of the same U.S. officers who dismiss the ARVN—Army of the Republic of Vietnam—as "worthless or worse" said the same thing about the Korean Army more than a decade ago. Now the Koreans in Vietnam are rated as topflight soldiers. It is pointed out, however, that the Korean Army was rebuilt after a war, not in the midst of it.

Few U.S. military men, talking privately, have many kind words for the ARVN. There is often considerable respect for individual Vietnamese soldiers. Some units, like the Marines, paratroops and Rangers, do a generally good job. But the ARVN, the main Vietnamese force, is doing only a small fraction of the job it should be doing.

ARVN's shortcomings are inadequate train-

ing, poor security, corruption, lack of supplies, and, above all, weakness of leadership.

Some of the training shortcomings are largely the Americans' fault. Until a little over two years ago, ARVN was trained primarily for a Korea-type, big-unit frontal war, not the kind of guerrilla fighting that developed in Vietnam.

One of the many intriguing Vietnam "might-have-beens" that a newcomer quickly hears is the thesis that if the ARVN had been trained as an antiguerrilla force five years ago, major U.S. units would not have been needed to beat back the Viet Cong in 1965-66.

ARVN security is so lax that often, in joint operations with U.S. forces, Vietnamese officers are told nothing until the last possible moment, to prevent battle plans from leaking to the enemy. There's a frequently expressed suspicion that Communist agents have infiltrated almost every ARVN unit.

The pilot of a U.S. Air Force C-130 transport one recent day thoroughly and personally searched the entire cabin after hauling a Vietnamese rifle company. He explained: "Last time I carried a bunch of Vietnamese, I found two hand grenades stuck under a piece of paneling. It may have been an accident, but why were the pins pulled halfway out?"

"Intolerable" corruption? In Vietnam, corruption is an accepted way of military and civilian life. A certain amount is inevitable in a society that is fighting a war, writing a constitution, holding elections, adjusting to alien cultures and developing economically all at once.

But a visitor cannot escape the conclusion the "tolerable" level of corruption has been far overstepped. There are too many stories of generals and colonels who don't really want the war to end because that would mean an end to their profits from renting apartments to Americans, black-marketing military supplies, and doing favors for anyone who's able to pay.

There are too many instances of Vietnamese soldiers going into villages with a rifle in one hand and a looting bag in the other. True, you do see Vietnamese soldiers carrying live chickens on their backs because their unit's supply services are so unreliable. But many times the soldiers "forget" to pay villagers for chickens they carry off.

Better leadership would cure most of the ARVN's ills. Few Americans, military or civilian, see where this leadership is coming from any time soon. Another of the many things that are apparent only after some time in South Vietnam is the fact that most of an entire leadership generation is missing. There are almost no high-ranking South Vietnamese officers who fought against the French for independence when that struggle was basically nationalist rather than Communist.

Many potential leaders, of course, have been killed in 20 years of conflict. But many also are in exile, sometimes self-imposed. Some are with the Communists.

Fifty-three ARVN battalions, half the Regular Army, now are assigned to protecting "Revolutionary Development" teams that are themselves supposed to protect Vietnam's hamlets and villages while starting them on the way to self-help development. In most cases, the RD teams are not getting much protection, and the hamlets and villages are not getting either security or development.

All over Vietnam, you hear stories of ARVN battalions that for one reason or another did not come to the aid of a hamlet being overrun by the Viet Cong less than a mile away from a battalion base.

A hamlet is the lowest level of Vietnamese government. It usually contains a half dozen to two dozen or more families living in thatch-roofed huts or simple wooden buildings on high ground alongside rice fields, or at some kind of road or trail crossing.

Unimpressive as the hamlets may be at first glance, winning control over these settlements and their people is what the war is really all about. Of roughly 12,500 hamlets in the country, about 2,000 now are firmly under Government control, and at least an equal number are under Communist control. The rest are "contested," meaning the Government may control them in the daytime, the Viet Cong at night, or that they are controlled by whoever happens to have a patrol on the spot.

Originally, the 1967 goal for the "other war" for reform and development was to firmly control or "pacify" another 1,100 hamlets. Now it is generally acknowledged even this modest goal cannot be met. Revolutionary Development teams are suffering steady erosion through VC attacks and desertions. Pacification is behind schedule in more than half of Vietnam's Provinces.

Spend as much as a week in Vietnam, and you will come to some conclusions.

Stay much longer, and most of the things you thought were answers turn back into questions. But a few things do seem solid.

While it is undoubtedly unrealistic to hope for much reform or economic progress in the midst of a war, the still precarious security situation is another matter. Unless a minimum of security can be maintained in the hamlets—perhaps defined as a peasant farmer's being able to plant rice with reasonable assurance of harvesting it a few months later—there is obviously little hope of ultimate triumph.

The real measure of success in Vietnam is not the "body count" of Communists killed. It is the miles of road open to safe travel, the rice acreage planted and harvested, the number of hamlets secure enough that the hamlet chief dares to sleep overnight in his own hut.

Americans have proved beyond any doubt they can win battles in Vietnam. But the war is roads, rice, hamlets and people. Any real turning point in that war still appears to be a long, expensive, frustrating distance away.

Mr. JAVITS, Mr. YOUNG of Ohio, and Mr. MANSFIELD addressed the Chair.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, if I have time remaining, I yield to the Senator from New York.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I came to the Chamber especially to hear the speech of the Senator from New Jersey. I am sorry that I missed most of it, but I do know what was contained in the speech.

I think the statement of the Senator from New Jersey is extremely important to our Nation because it speaks with a voice of responsibility: The question which the Senator from New Jersey properly raises cannot be begged.

To have a declaration of war, as some have asked with respect to Vietnam, would enormously complicate our situation legally, and it might expand the war by our emotions. We do not want to bring into being so many complications, many of which we could not and should not endeavor to deal with at this particular time. This would be most unwise.

Mr. President, the technique of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution is a sound one. President Eisenhower used it with respect to the entry of marines into Lebanon, where it worked effectively.

I agree with the Senator that it is tragic, indeed, that it should suffer the discredit which it obviously has. In addition, it is completely obsolete in terms of time, not being germane or apposite to the situation we now face.