

Near dawn on the morning of July 16, 1945, General Farrell¹ drove back with me from the control bunker to the base camp. We called the place Trinity. On the old maps it has the name Jornada del Muerto. It was then part of the Alamogordo bombing range; now it is part of the larger White Sands missile range.

General Farrell spoke of the times, in the First World War, when, as a young lieutenant, he stood with a foot on the step, waiting to lead his men out of the trench into combat. "That," he said, "was nothing like what we have just been through."

He said that the end of the war was now near; perhaps, he added, the end of all such wars. What we had just been through was the explosion of the first atomic bomb. It had not been a dud.

At the base camp, I worked with General Groves on the technical results of the test for his report to Secretary Stimson in Potsdam; for him, for the President, probably for Churchill, perhaps for some talk with Stalin. Later, Vannevar Bush spoke with me; he knew that we² hoped that our Government would take up with the Allied governments the future problems of the bomb, the future hope of collaboration and indeed the use of the bombs in the Pacific war. Bush told me that this had been decided. Nothing much like that was to happen; but neither of us then knew it.

In the morning air, most of us shared, clearly with no grounds for confidence, the two hopes of which General Farrell spoke. For a year, with the imminent defeat of the Axis in Europe and the growing weakness of the Japanese in the Pacific, more and more we had thought of the peril and the hope that our work would bring to human history: the peril of these weapons and their almost inevitable vast increase; and the hope of limiting and avoiding war, and of new patterns and institutions of international cooperation, insight, and understanding.

AN ANGRY JAPANESE

There was no such simple sense 3 weeks later, with the use of the bombs in Japan and the end of the war, marked by this final cruel slaughter. Much has been written on the wisdom of those actions, and on imagined alternatives. I would not add again to this debate, but would make one comment.

In Hiroshima in August 1945, there was a hospital for postal and telegraphic workers. Day by day, Dr. Hachiya, who was in charge of it, kept a diary. He was himself hurt by the explosion, but managed to get back to his hospital. He wrote of the dying who came there, the burned and the mutilated, and of the sickness, not at first clear to him, caused by radiation: often the injured recovered, and others, not seemingly hurt at all, sickened and died.

There is no outrage or anger in these pages. But in one entry Dr. Hachiya is angry: he had heard the rumor of an imperial rescript in which the Emperor asked the Japanese Government to end the war. It was not only the generals and the Kamikaze who were determined to fight to the death.

If we should speak of regret, we should remember that these considerations, looking to the end of the war and toward the future, were not those that led to the initiation of serious work on the bomb. Already in 1939, in this country, Szilard, with help from Wigner and with the support of Einstein, indicated to our Government the possible importance of the uranium project, its possible military use.

¹ Brig. Gen. Thomas Farrell, deputy to Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves, commanding officer of the Manhattan project.

² Arthur Compton, Fermi, Lawrence, and Oppenheimer, the scientific panel to the Secretary of War's Interim Committee on Atomic Problems.

In England, Peierls and Frisch, like their American colleagues refugees from tyranny, addressed similar pleas to the Government of the United Kingdom. Peierls' work had a clarity and firmness of program at the time unmatched in this country. He thought that he knew how to make a bomb; he was quite sure that it would work.

It was not until the autumn of 1941 that serious consideration was given here to making a bomb; it was not until then that the British had seen that our help was needed and that they could not go it alone. Then, just before Pearl Harbor, with El Alamein and Stalingrad still a year away and the defeat of the Axis far from assured, we did get to work. I think it a valid ground for regret that those 2 years were lost, 2 years of slaughter, degradation, and despair.

THE MOOD OF HOPE

The last two decades have been shadowed by danger, ever changing, never really receding. Looking to the future, I see again no ground for confidence; but I do see hope.

The mood of hope is not as bright today as 2 years ago. Then, after the crisis in Cuba, President Kennedy spoke at American University and Pope John XXIII wrote his "Pacem in Terris," giving the noblest and most rounded expression of what we vaguely thought 20 years earlier in the desert.

But it is not the mood of hope, but hope itself, that is part of our life, and thus part of our duty. We are engaged in this great enterprise of our time, testing whether men can both preserve and enlarge life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and live without war as the great arbiter of history.

This we knew early in the morning of July 16, 20 years ago.

VIETNAM

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, it is apparent from developments in the past 72 hours that the Congress and the people of the United States will shortly be confronted with new decisions respecting Vietnam.

President Johnson spoke Tuesday of new and serious decisions in the making, and the Secretary of Defense intimated Wednesday that these decisions would be forthcoming upon his return from Saigon next week.

All indications point to requests by the President for additional defense appropriations and—more importantly—specific legislative authority to call up a large number of reservists and to extend the terms of service of members of the Active Forces.

These are grave steps for the country and will affect directly the lives and families of thousands of our citizens.

The stage is thus being set for congressional and public review of the course of the war in Vietnam, the deepening involvement of the United States in that war, and the assumptions upon which the administration is proceeding with respect to our proclaimed goal of a peaceful settlement.

I have taken the position that, so long as our military operations remain compatible with our stated objective of negotiations, there has been no real alternative to our present course—and I have supported that course.

Now that we are to be asked, in all probability, for a fresh mandate, we shall look to the President to give us a full account both of the existing situation in Vietnam and of his administration's

aims. We, in the Congress, must and will examine his proposals with the utmost care and deliberation.

BIG BROTHER: SNOOPING BY INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE

Mr. LONG of Missouri. Mr. President, during the past few days, the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure has been holding hearings on snooping techniques of the Internal Revenue Service.

Although I am becoming hardened at the revelations made by Federal officials when put under oath on this subject, even I was appalled at the confirmation of some of the items that our staff had found.

Frankly, when my staff counsel first told me that IRS had permanent bugs and secret cameras planted in its own conference rooms, I was very skeptical.

My skepticism turned out to be misplaced as Mr. Sheldon Cohen, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, admitted under oath to such bugged rooms on IRS premises in such widely scattered places as Baltimore, Kansas City, Alexandria, Va., and New York City.

When I was told that IRS in Pittsburgh used a disguised telephone company truck to look inconspicuous when they went on wiretapping expeditions, I was even more skeptical; after all, IRS had banned all wiretapping for years.

Again, I was wrong, IRS had such a truck and used it for just such illegal purposes.

The revelations went on and on.

Next Monday we will begin 3 days of hearings on the situation in the Boston area.

At this time, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to print at this point in the RECORD several news stories outlining what we found in Pittsburgh.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 14, 1965]

WITNESS SAYS IRS HEADQUARTERS HELPED IN PITTSBURGH WIRETAP—WASHINGTON SENT EQUIPMENT, EXPERT, SENATORS ARE TOLD

(By James C. Millstone, a Washington correspondent of the Post-Dispatch)

WASHINGTON, July 14.—Internal Revenue Service headquarters in Washington sent equipment and an expert technician to install two wiretaps in the Pittsburgh area, congressional investigators were told today.

Cresson O. Davis, Chief of the IRS Intelligence Division in Pittsburgh, gave the testimony at a hearing by the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, headed by Senator Edward V. Long, Democrat, of Missouri. The subcommittee is devoting its attention currently to IRS practices.

Davis said that he had a part in authorizing both wiretaps although he knew such action was against IRS regulations. Both cases, he said, involved investigations of organized crime operations.

He said that he knew of two instances in which Pittsburgh IRS agents used hidden microphones to record conversations with persons not involved in organized crime. Both were efforts to obtain evidence about falsified tax returns, Davis said.

When Long asked whether it was IRS procedure to ignore constitutional rights of citi-